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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

CaseNo.981398-CA

WENDELL NAVANICK,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

mi IFF o r u i ELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The defendant appeals ajudgment and conviction resulting from a conJrjona. _... tv
plea for possession of a controlled subbtaiiLu, ,.i ilmil ik-gret. IrlmiN

1 Mum nl'l N ili i ml

s jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(e)(Suppl996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue:
believed

ona

iv-aino officer reasonably

defendant was the person sought under an arrest warrant for "Wendell

Navanick" where defendant shared the uncommon first and last names and a nearly identical
birthdate listed on the warrant?

Standard of Review: "The trial court's factual findings underlying its decision to
grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are examined for clear error." State v. Case, 884
P.2d 1274,1276 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932,935-36 (Utah 1994)).
"Findings of fact are clearly erroneous only if they are not adequately supported by the
record." State v. Humphrey. 937 P.2d 137,140 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v. Anderson,
910 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1996)). A trial court's determination of whether an officer had
a reasonable belief is a conclusion of law, reviewed for correctness." See Humphrey, 937
P.2d at 140 (determination of whether officer had reasonable articulable suspicion is
conclusion of law). "Nevertheless, the nature of this particular determination of law allows
the trial court 'a measure of discretion . . . when applying that standard to a set of given
facts.'" Case. 884 P.2d at 1276 (citing Pena, 869 P.2d at 939).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The text of the following statutes and constitutional provisions relevant to this appeal
is included in addendum A:
U.S. Const. Amend. IV;
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-11 (1997).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
An August 14, 1997 information charged defendant with unlawful possession of a
controlled substance, a third degree felony (R. 07). Defendant moved to suppress drugs
found on him during a standard "booking search" conducted at the Salt Lake County Jail (R.
43). The trial court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing (R. 133-38,139; 290:99102). The trial court entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its
ruling (R. 133-38). (A copy of thefindingsand conclusions are reproduced in addendum
B).
Defendant pled guilty as charged on the condition that he be allowed to appeal the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress (R. 226-27). The court sentenced defendant to
zero-to-five years in prison, but suspended the sentence in favor of thirty-six months
probation to include one-year's incarceration in jail (R. 270-71). Defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal (R. 281), and the trial court issued a certificate of probable cause and stay
of sentence pending the appeal (R. 273).

3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
The Arrest
On the night of July 3, 1997, Salt Lake City police officer Bryan Bailey received a
report from the manager of a downtown Motel 6 that she suspected a guest of "pimping"
because she had seen several young girls going in and out of his room (R. 290:8,16). Based
on the registration card, the manager identified the guest as Wendell Navanick and told
Officer Bailey that he could be found in Room 148 (R. 290:9-10, 16). Officer Bailey was
familiar with the name and, at the suppression hearing, identified defendant as the person he
knew as Wendell Navanick (R. 290:10-11).
Bailey asked Detective Mitchell to handle the call (R. 290:10, 12).

Before

responding, Mitchell contacted dispatch and learned that Wendell Navanick, with a birthdate
of 11-27-71, had an arrest warrant out of West Valley City for telephone harassment (R.
290:16). Mitchell then checked his department's computer records to see if he could find a
physical description of Wendell Navanick because the warrant did not have one (R. 290:1618, 31). Although Mitchell did not find a physical description in those records, he did
discover that there were two birthdates associated with the name: the birthdate listed on the
warrant, 11-27-71, and an alias birthdate of 1-7-71 (R. 290:16-17). According to the

Unless otherwise stated, the following facts are recited in light most favorable to
the trial court's ruling. See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 537 n.l (Utah App. 1997); State
v. Delanev. 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994).
4

department records, both "dates of birth had shared an address" in the past (R. 290:16-18).
Mitchell thought the name Wendell Navanick uncommon, one that he had never heard before
in his experience as a police officer (R. 290:19, 38).
Mitchell went with Detectives Hatch and Ewell to the Motel 6 to execute the arrest
warrant (R. 290:19,38). The officers went directly to Room 148 where they knocked on the
door (R. 290:21). Defendant answered the door and the officers could see two females inside
the room (R. 290:21,28,41). Detective Hatch recognized defendant as Wendell Navanick
from a past experience (R. 290:21).2
Mitchell identified himself and asked defendant to step outside (R. 290:21-22).
Mitchell asked defendant for his name and date of birth (R. 290:22, 28). Defendant
responded "Wendell Navanick" and stated his date of birth as 1-7-71, the "alias" birthdate
Mitchell had earlier retrieved from department records (R. 290:16, 17, 22) Mitchell told
defendant he had a warrant for his arrest from West Valley City for phone harassment (R.
290: 22, 29).
Defendant initially appeared confused (290:22, 29). After a moment, defendant
protested that he was not the person named in the warrant and that he did not know who it

2

There was some confusion as to which Motel 6 in downtown Salt Lake Mitchell
was directed to. Bailey testified that the call camefromthe Motel 6 manager on 600
South (R. 290:8-9). Mitchell, however, testified that Bailey directed him to the Motel 6
on North Temple (R. 290:15, 20, 28). The discrepancy is irrelevant because Mitchell
apparently went to the correct Motel 6 as he found "Wendell Navanick" in the room given
by the manager (R. 290:16, 19, 20-21).
5

was for (R. 290:22, 25-26, 30).3 Mitchell did not believe defendant, however, because the
name and the birthdate matched the information he had found on the computer (R. 290:2526). From his experience as a police officer, Mitchell knew that people wishing to evade
arrest commonly changed their date of birth so that when the officer checked for warrants
he would not find one under that name and birthdate (R. 290:26). Mitchell also testified that
in his experience people often changed their birthdate to a similar number so that they could
remember which date had been given (R. 290:26). Defendant did not have any identification
on him that would show that he was not the person named on the arrest warrant (R. 136;
290:25).
Mitchell cuffed defendant, performed a cursory pat-down frisk which produced no
weapons or contraband, and transported defendant to the Salt Lake County Jail (R. 290:2223, 29, 30-31). Mitchell testified that other than the arrest warrant, there was no reason to
arrest defendant at that time (R. 290:23, 30).

3

Defendant testified that he told the officers that there were two Wendell
Navanicks and that they had the wrong one (R. 290:42). Defendant also claimed that he
asked the officers "kindly" to check the birthdate or social security number before
arresting him (R. 290:42). The trial court, however, specifically found that defendant was
not credible (R. 136; 290:101-02). The court apparently believed Mitchell's version of
events here because itsfindingsreflect only that defendant denied he was the person in
the warrant and not that defendant told the officers that there was another "Wendell
Navanick" or that he asked the officers to run a further check (R. 136). Defendant has not
challenged this finding as clearly erroneous on appeal. See State v. Case. 884 P.2d 1274,
1276 (Utah App. 1994) (trial court's factual findings underlying decision to grant or deny
motion to suppress are reviewed for clear error).
6

The Search
At the jail, Mitchell began entering information concerning the arrest into a computer
(R. 290:23, 31). Within a few minutes, one of the jailers informed Mitchell that during the
standard operational "booking search," he had found a small plastic twist containing what
appeared to be illegal drugs in defendant's right front pocket (R. 290:23-25). Mitchell took
custody of the twist and added the charge of possession of a controlled substance to his
computer entry (Id.). The substance in the twist was later tested and found to be
amphetamine (R. 8, 136; 290:36).
About five minutes after the drugs were found, another booking officer told Mitchell
that there were two Wendell Navanicks in the system and that defendant might not be the
Wendell Navanick named in the warrant (R. 290:24-25,37,62,66). 4 Mitchell was surprised
to hear this because he believed he had arrested the correct Wendell Navanick. (R. 290: 27).

4

Defendant states in the fact summary of his brief that the amphetamine was found
after the booking officer had discovered that they might have the wrong person. Br. Aplt.
5. That statement is not supported by the record. Defendant testified at the suppression
hearing that the drugs were found "pretty much simultaneously" with the announcement
that defendant might be the wrong person (R. 290:44-45). To the extent this testimony
conflicts with Mitchell's testimony, it must be assumed that the trial court accepted
Mitchell's version of events here because it more clearly supports the trial court's ruling.
See Yoder, 935 P.2d at 537 n.l (on appeal facts are viewed in light most favorable to trial
court's ruling). Moreover, the trial court here specifically found that defendant's
testimony was not credible (R. 136; 290:100-01). That determination was in the sole
province of the trial court. State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1039 (Utah 1987) (credibility
of witnesses and weight to be given to conflicting testimony are within province of fact
finder); State v. Lairbv. 699 P.2d 1187, 1207 (Utah 1984) (not responsibility of appellate
court to measure conflicting evidence; that responsibility belongs strictly to trier of fact).

7

Defendant was not booked on the arrest warrant, but was booked on unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (R. 290:62-63, 63-65; Defendant's Ex. 3).5
Suppression Hearing
Defendant moved to suppress the amphetamine on the grounds that 1) the arrest
warrant was facially invalid because it had not been signed and, 2) the arrest of defendant
was unreasonable because the officers could not have reasonably believed under these
circumstances that defendant was the person named in the warrant (R. 48-60). When the
State produced evidence that the warrant had been signed, defendant contended that the
warrant was invalid as to defendant because it named another person (R. 80, 86, 94-98).
At the suppression hearing, Mitchell testified regarding the information he possessed
at the time of the arrest, the circumstances surrounding the arrest itself, the search at the jail,
and the discovery that defendant was not the person named in the warrant (R. 290:14-39).
Defendant also testified, offering conflicting testimony as to his true name. Initially,
defendant claimed he had never used any name other than Wendell Navanick (R. 290:40).
On cross-examination, however, defendant conceded that he had used the middle name of

5

The trial court found that the evidence was inconclusive as to whether or not
defendant was in fact the Wendell Navanick named in the warrant (R. 290:101). The
court then went on to rule the search was valid because the officers possessed a valid
arrest warrant and because they reasonably believed that defendant was the person named
in the warrant (R. 290:101-02). Because the court made no finding on this point and the
evidence is inconclusive, the State assumes for purposes of this appeal that defendant is
not the Wendell Navanick named in the warrant.
8

"John" in the past and that the name "John Kim Gutierrez" had at one time appeared on his
social security card, school records, and juvenile court records (R. 290:46-47). Defendant
also admitted that he may have been charged as a juvenile with giving a false name to police
(R. 290:48).
Defendant testified that he was aware of two other persons with the name Wendell
Navanick: a Wendell Navanick, Sr. and a Wendell Navanick, Jr. (R. 290:48-49). Defendant
stated that both spelled their name the same way defendant spelled his name (R. 290:48-49).
Defendant believed that Wendell Navanick, ' i >' \, i • J >> > i" - I * J"'', t h e <a • n v \ t, i r J i- h ij '"< l
I

,, j |si

}{| S2-53). Defendant also stated that he had never met the two other Wendell

Navanicks and that he was not biologically related to either (R.290:48-49). Defendant
introduced evidence that he and the other Wendell Navanick did not look anything alike, that
they had different ethnic origins and that they had significant!) different heights, weights,
).

Defendant testified that police had confused him for the other Wendell Navanick "a
couple of times" (R. 290:48). Defendant had not brought the mistake to the attention of the
police officers in the prior incidents, however, because defendant h<ul other H .irranl:, ,ii ilu
i officers h > discover that fact (R. 290:48-49).
After hearing the testimony of Bailey, Mitchell, defendant, and a booking officer from
the jail, the trial court denied defendant's motion and entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law (R. 133-39; Add. B). Based on the testimony before it, lln u u l
9

concluded that the search was valid because the officers reasonably believed that defendant
was the person named in the warrant (R. 133-37; Add. B). The court also concluded that the
arrest warrant was valid (R. 137; Add. B).
Additional relevant facts are contained in the argument section.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A search incident to the arrest of a person mistakenly thought to be someone else is
valid under the Fourth Amendment if the arresting officer 1) had probable cause to arrest the
person sought, and 2) reasonably believed that the person arrested was the person sought.
Here, the police had probable cause to arrest a person named "Wendell Navanick" because
there was a valid warrant for his arrest. In addition, under the particular circumstances of this
case, the police reasonably believed that defendant was the "Wendell Navanick" named in
the warrant. Both shared the same uncommon first and last names and defendant gave police
a birthdate that matched an "alias" birthdate of the person named in the warrant. Moreover,
the arresting officer was aware that the birthdate given by defendant had once shared the
same address as the name and birthdate listed on the warrant.
Because the officers reasonably believed that defendant was the person named in the
warrant, his arrest and subsequent search was reasonable.

10

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT REASONABLY CONCLUDED THAI IHE
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT WAS VALID UNDER THE FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE BECAUSE THE ARRESTING
OFFICER REASONABLY BELIEVED THAT DEFENDANT WAS
THE PERSON NAMED IN THE ARREST WARRANT.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in not suppressing the drugs seized as a
result of his mistaken arrest, Br Aplt. 8-9. Defendant asserts that his arrest w as ii 1 valid
nude,! llic hiuith ;' mii'iulmnil h.xause it wa

-

cresting officer to

believe that defendant was the person named in the arrest warrant. Br. Aplt. 9-10, 13-15.
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the trial court reasonably concluded that under the
particular circumstances of this case, the arresting officer reasonably believed that defendant
was the " VV ei idell T la v anick1 i lai: i led it i III: le v ai r ai it.

- • ' -.

i\s defendant correctly points out in his brief, a search incident to the arrest of a
person mistakenly thought to be someone else is valid under the Fourth Amendment if the
arresting officer 1) had probable cause to arrest the person sought, and 2) reasonably believed
that the person arrested was the person sought. Hill v. California -

*

>1

i); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-1 i ^1995) (providing that any
peace officer having knowledge of a outstanding arrest warrant may arrest a person "he
reasonably believes to be the person described in the warrant").
Here, the police clearly had probable laust1 lo ariiMl .mi nulr nlnul ii.inieil HVmlrll

11

Navanick" because a valid warrant had been issued for his arrest.6 The question, then, is

6

As stated, the trial court specifically found that the arrest warrant was valid in this
case (R. 137; 290:101-02). In a footnote, however, defendant states that he does not
"concede [the warrant's] validity." Br. Aplt. 10-11 n.5. He then asserts that the warrant
was invalid because it did not meet the particularity requirement of the Fourth
Amendment as it misspelled the name of the arrestee as "Wendall Navanick," instead of
"Wendell," the spelling used by all three individuals. Id Defendant posits that this minor
misspelling invalidated the warrant because it did not correctly name the arrestee. Id.
Defendant reasons that if the warrant was invalid, and the officer had no independent
probable cause for arresting him, the first prong of Hill has not been met. Defendant also
contends that the good faith exception to an invalid warrant under United States v. Leon.
468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984) does not apply here because the misspelling
rendered the warrant so "obviously deficient" that the officer could not have "reasonably
presume[d] it to be valid." Br. Aplt. 10-11 n.5 (quoting Leon. 468 U.S. at 923).
Defendant is precluded from making this argument on appeal because he did not
make it below. State v. Olsen. 860 P.2d 332, 335 (Utah 1993); State v. Lopez. 886 P.2d
1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). Although defendant challenged the validity of the warrant
below, he did so only on the grounds that it was unsigned (R. 48-49) and that it was
invalid as to him because it was intended for another person (R. 95; 20:88-89, 90-99). As
stated, the State produced a copy of the signed warrant and the trial court rejected
defendant's contention that the arrest was invalid merely because it turned out that
defendant was not person named in the warrant (R. 80, 86, 137; 290:101-02). Defendant
never argued below that the warrant was invalid because it did not correctly name the
arrestee, only that it did not name the defendant (R. 48-49, 94-98; 290:88-89, 90-91).
Defendant has therefore waived this argument. See State v. Beltran-Felix. 922 P.2d 30,
33 (Utah App. 1996) (defendant may not argue one ground below and then argue
different ground on appeal).
In any event, defendant's argument is without merit. The misspelling was clearly
a minor clerical error as Officer Mitchell testified that the name was spelled "Wendell" on
all other records (R. 290:34-35; see also Defendant's Ex. 3 (Salt Lake Co. Jail Booking
Record)). Such a minor clerical error by itself does not invalidate an arrest warrant,
particularly where, as here, the error would not have led an officer to believe that the
warrant was intended for someone other than Wendell Navanick. See State v. South. 932
P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah App.) (technical deficiencies in search warrant's description of
place to be searched do not necessarily invalidate warrant), cert, denied. 940 P.2d 1244
(Utah 1997); State v. Kellv. 718 P.2d 385, 392 (Utah 1986) (incorrect street number on
warrant which was later corrected does not invalidate warrant or require suppression of
12

whether Officer Mitchell reasonably believed that defendant was the person named in the
warrant. The standard of reasonableness is "sufficient probability," not absolute "certainty."
Hill, 401 U.S. at 804, "ll! N I't, at I I I Moreover, reasonableness Is tldtTiniiied inula the
totality of Hi • iivuNisUna's. United States v. Glover. 72S }' ?d 1 ,?(), 122 (C.A.D.C. 1984).
A number of courts have considered under what circumstances an officer who arrests
the wrong person reasonably believes that the person arrested was the one sought. For
example, the Supreme Court held in Hill that officers acted reasonably when they arrested
a person they mistakenly hclievcd IO IK I ill! and ilnni '.ran lied Hill's .ip.utmtMit itn nlntn mo
i

ustaken arrest. HilL 401 U.S. at 803-04. Two robbery suspects had implicated Hill as

a fellow participant in the robbery, and told police that the guns used in the robbery and other
stolen property could befoundin Hill's apartment. Id. at 798-99 I he suspects gave police

evidence); State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985) (searches should
invalidated solely because of minor technical deficiencies on search warrant's
description). Nor does such a minor clerical error make the warrant so "obviously
deficient" that it would be unreasonable for the officer to rely on it, thereby taking it out
of Leon's good faith exception. See Arizona v. Evans. 514 U.S. 1, 14 (1994) (evidence
seized as result of court clerk's clerical error on computer records failing to recall
quashed warrant, falls within good faith exception to exclusionary rule); see also Powe v.
City of Chicago. 664 F.2d 639, 647 (7th Cir. 1981) (arrest not necessarily invalid because
it incorrectly names intended arrestee and does not contain physical description; arrest
may be valid if authorities responsible for preparing warrant have good reason to believe
that name on warrant is real name of intended arrestee and there is no reason to suspect
otherwise). It is also significant in this case that Mitchell testified that although he was
aware of the existence of the warrant, he was not aware at the time that the name had
been misspelled on the warrant (R. 290:30).
13

a physical description of Hill and his address. Id. The officers verified the information and
concluded that they had probable cause to arrest Hill without a warrant. Id. at 799.
When police arrived at Hill's apartment they found a man named Miller whofitHill's
description "exactly." Id. The officers arrested Miller even though he denied being Hill and
produced identification to that effect. IdL. The officers did not believe Miller because he fit
Hill's description, could not explain how he got into Hill's apartment which had a lock on
the door, and he denied knowing anything about any stolen property or guns even though
there was a gun and clip of ammunition lying in plain view where the arrest took place. IdL
Observing that "aliases and false identifications are not uncommon," the Hill Court
concluded that "on the record before [it] the officers' mistake was understandable and the
arrest was a reasonable response to the situation facing them at the time." Id. at 803-04. The
officers were therefore "entitled to do what the law would have allowed them to do if Miller
had in fact been Hill, that is to search incident to arrest

" IdL at 804.

Similarly, in a case much like this one, the Iowa Court of Appeals sustained as
reasonable an officer's belief that the person arrested was the one named in an outstanding
traffic warrant. State v. Pavton. 401 N.W.2d 219,220 (Iowa Ct. App 1988). In Pavton. the
defendant gave a Department of Transportation form as identification when stopped for a
traffic violation. The name on the form was "Donald Devem Payton 11." A standard license
check revealed outstanding parking warrants and a notice of driver's license suspension for
a "Donald Payton." Based on that information, the officer arrested the defendant and upon
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searching his van discovered illegal firearms. It was later discovered that the outstanding
warrants were for defendant's father. Id at 220.
The Payton court held because the defendant's name was the same as that on the
outstanding wan 1.1 ml ^ and ddtndanl lacked a dnu i \ limn i A\\I\ nluilifii .ltmn Lin: ullun
was reasonable in believing that the defendant was the person named in the warrant. Id. at
221.
Likewise, in Sanders v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held
that a search

person mistakenly arrested w as - alid because 1:1 le c f ficei i easonably

believed that defendant was the person named in the warrant. 339 A.2d 373 (u.^.^.A.
1975). There, an officer observed defendant acting suspiciously and stopped him to ask for
identification. Id. at 375. The defendant produced an identification card on which his last
name was misspelled as Saunders, rather than Sanders. Id. The officer allowed the suspect
defendant's name using

-. incorrect spelling taken from

identification card. The dispatcher responded that there was an arrest warrant, asked for a
general description, and concluded that defendant matched the description on the warrant.
Id. The officer, who had kept Sanders in sight, took him into custody and during the
^mediately after
Sanders was arrested, the dispatcher radioed that the warrant was actually for another man.
Id.
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The Sanders court concluded that the search was valid because under these facts the
officer had acted reasonably and in good faith in arresting the defendant. Id. at 378-79.7
Like the officers in Hill Payton, and Sanders, the officer in this case had a reasonable
basis for believing that defendant was the same "Wendell Navanick" named in the arrest
warrant. Both had the same uncommon first and last names. Before going to arrest
defendant, Mitchell searched his department records for a physical description (R. 290:16-18,

7

See also United States v. McEachern. 675 F.2d 618, 620-622 (4th Cir. 1982)
(police acted reasonably in mistakenly arresting defendant for his brother where police
believed they used the same name, they listed same address, and physical descriptions
matched, even though their birthdates were different); Blackwell v. Barton, 34 F.3d 298,
303-04 (5th Cir. 1994) (officer's mistake in arresting plaintiff in § 1983 civil action was
objectively reasonable even though plaintiff had different first and last name and different
hair and eye color where plaintiff shared with intended arrestee same height, weight, sex,
race, age, nickname, and was at location where suspect was expected to be); White v.
Olig. 56 F.3d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1995) (officer acted reasonably in mistakenly arresting
plaintiff in § 1983 civil rights action despite discrepancies in physical description where
defendant shared same name, race, county of residence, birthdate, and approximate
weight as person listed in arrest warrant); Patton v. Przybylski, 822 F.2d 697, 699-700
(7th Cir. 1987) (officer did not act unreasonably in mistakenly arresting plaintiff in §
1983 civil rights action where plaintiff shared same first and last name in arrest warrant,
race, and the same year of birth, even though addresses and birthdate were different);
United State v. Bobo. 994 F.2d 524, 527 (8th Cir. 1993) (police reasonably believed that
defendant was his brother who was named in arrest warrant where brothers resembled
each other and defendant was driving his brother's car). Cf. State v. Frazier, 318 N.W.2d
42,43-44 (Minn. 1982) (not reasonable for police to mistakenly arrest defendant where
she denied being the suspect, had different name, was twice as old, shorter, and heavier
than suspect, and where police arrested her outside a public place where suspect was
believed to frequent); State v. Lee. 294 N.W.2d 547, 550-51 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980) (police
did not act reasonably in mistakenly arresting defendant where he disclaimed being the
person sought, did not share the same name as the person sought, and the only physical
description of suspect was "young white male).
16

31). Although he did not find one, he verified that two birthdates were associated with the
name on the warrant (R. 290:16-18). The two birthdates, one of which was listed on the
warrant, were almost identical, sharing all but two digits and having the same birth year (R.
Wendell Navanick"

rthdates had

shared an address in the past, leading Mitchell to conclude that one of the birthdates was an
"alias" that could be given to conceal identity (R. 290:16-18).
When Mitchell arrived at the Motel 6, defendant identified himself as "Wendell
1 4a i- ai lick,' tl i = in: lan le appearing on llir am; t uatian! and ii.ii t; Mill In 111 flu* " ilia^'" biffhilak
(R. 290:16,17,22). Defendant had no identification on him (R. 136; 290:25). Under these
circumstances, Mitchell could and did reasonably believe that defendant was the person
named in the warrant. Based on his previous experience that arrestees often give false names
urthdates to a v oidai i est, N litcl le 11 c oi ill ialsoi easonablj , - .

.t defendant was

telling the truth when he protested that they had the wrong person (R. 290:25-26).
Defendant nevertheless contends that his arrest was unreasonable because there were
"obvious" discrepancies between the information on the warrant and the information Mitchell
obtained from the computer

6. Specifically, defendant points to the fact that

the warrant had only one date of birth while the computer showed two dates of birth and to
the fact that defendant was not at the address stated in the warrant. Br. Aplt. 14-15.
Defendant asserts that these discrepancies, coupled with defendant's protest that police had
the wrong person, should have alerted Mitchell to the fact that defendant was not the person
17

named in the warrant. Br. Aplt. 13-19. Relying on United States v. Glover, 725 F.2d 120
(C.A.D.C. 1984), defendant claims that in light of these "obvious" discrepancies Mitchell
was required to contact the West Valley City Police or the Salt Lake County Jail to try to
obtain a physical description of the person named in the warrant. Br. Aplt. 14-16.
Defendant's reliance on Glover is misplaced. The Glover court held that when an
officer has doubt that he is in pursuit of the correct individual, the officer must make
immediate and reasonable efforts to confirm the suspect's identity. Glover. 725 F.2d at 123
(C.A.D.C. 1984); see also Sanders. 339 A.D. at 379 (recognizing that "should doubt as to the
correct identity of the subject arise, the arresting officer should make immediate reasonable
efforts to confirm or deny the applicability of the warrant to the detained individual"). Here,
Mitchell had no doubts or discrepancies to clear up. Defendant had already named himself
as the person listed on the warrant and had given an alias birthdate that was identical to the
one on the warrant except for two digits (R. 290:16, 17, 22). The fact that the computer
listed two birthdates and the warrant listed only one was not enough under these
circumstances to raise a doubt in Mitchell's mind that defendant might not be the person
sought. Indeed, the fact that the birthdates were nearly identical and had once been
associated with the same address would merely confirm Mitchell's belief that one was an
"alias" birthdate. Defendant produced no identification that would show that a mistake had
been made and under these circumstances his disclaimers alone would not have been enough
to raise a doubt concerning his identity (R. 290:16-18). See HiU, 401 U.S. at 803-04; Baker
18

v. McCollan. 443 U.S. 137, 145-46, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2695 (1979) (constitution does not
require sheriff executing arrest warrant to investigate every claim of innocence based on
mistaken identity or a defense such as lack of requisite intent).
While it is true that Mitchell did not have a physical description oftlle subject named
in the warr

l

fact alone does not 11 lake Mitchell's mistake unreasonable. Mitchell had

a name and date of birth, as well as an alias date of birth. Given that defendant shared this
unusual first and last name and a nearly identical birthdate with the suspect, this information
was specific enough to allow Mitchell to reasonably believe that he had the right person in
CM istodj • w itl IOI it checking for a physical descriptioi i
There is no rule, as defendant seems to suggest, that requires an officer to suspend the
arrest process and make immediate inquiries into an arrestee's identification every time a
suspect claims he is not the correct individual. See Baker, 443 U.S.
\: \vi ul my, an cs 1 w iiiii fi .iiiil m »l 11 i |ij

H^ P 979) (officer
. ugate e\ ery

claim of innocence, even one based on mistaken identity). Such a proposition would be
impractical because as the Hill court recognized, and Mitchell testified, suspects often
attempt to conceal their true identity by giving false names and birthdates (R. 290:25-26).
HilL401U.S.
The issue here is not whether the mistaken arrest could have been avoided if Mitchell
had obtained a physical description of the warrant's subject. Rather, the question is whether
it was reasonable for the officer under the totality of these particular circumstances to arrest
19

defendant without trying to check any further than he did for a physical description. Given
that the officer had an arrest warrant carrying the same unusual first and last name of
defendant and that defendant identified himself to the officer as that person and gave a
similar "alias" birthdate, the officer had no reason to believe he had the wrong person. It was
therefore reasonable for the officer to arrest defendant without further inquiry at that point.
Because it was reasonable for the officer to believe under these circumstances that
defendant was the person named in the arrest warrant, the trial court properly denied
defendant's motion to suppress.8

8

Defendant also contends that Mitchell acted unreasonably and in bad faith
because "an officer notified Mitchell, as Mitchell conducted the pat-down search that later
revealed amphetamine, that there may be two people by the same name." Br. Aplt. 19.
Defendant asserts that at this point Mitchell should have immediately stopped the search
to verify that defendant was in fact the person named in the warrant. The factual
assertions underlying this argument are not supported by the evidence. Mitchell did not
conduct the search at the jail (R. 290:23-25). His uncontroverted testimony was that he
was sitting at the computer when a jailer brought him the amphetamine and reported that
it had been found on defendant (R. 290:23-25). Mitchell then testified that he was not
informed of a possible mistake in identify until about five minutes after the amphetamine
had been found (R. 20:24-25, 37, 62, 66).
As noted in footnote 4, supra, defendant testified that the drugs were found almost
simultaneously to the discovery that defendant was not the right person (R. 290:44-45).
Neither of these factual scenarios supports defendant contention on appeal that Mitchell
acted in bad faith or that the mistake in identity was found before the search.
Moreover, defendant never raised this argument below, thereby precluding him
from raising it now. Olsen. 860 P.2d at 335; Lopez, 886 P.2d at 1113.
20

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial
court's ruling..
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \(J® day of Marci
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
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ADDENDUM A
Constitutional Provision and Statute

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
efTects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.

^•11. Possession of warrant by arresting officer not
required.
Any peace officer who has knowledge of an outstanding warrant of arrest
^: arrest a person he reasonably believes to be the person described in the
^"rant, without the peace officer having physical possession of the warrant.
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
CaseNo.971015158FS

-V-

WENDELL NAVANICK,
Hon. Tyrone E. Medley
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress, filed in the above-entitled matter, came on for
hearing before the Court on February 20, 1998.

Defendant was present and was

represented by his counsel, Ralph Dellapiana, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, and
the State of Utah was represented by N. M. D'Alesandro, Deputy District Attorney.
Defendant moved to suppress the search and seizure of amphetamine, a controlled
substance, on the grounds that it was seized pursuant to an illegal arrest and search. More
specifically, defendant argued that the police did not have a facially valid warrant nor
probable cause to arrest the defendant. Defendant further argued that even if the arrest
warrant that the police relied upon in arresting defendant was facially valid, his was a

case of mistaken identity caused by the failure of the police to take reasonable steps to
confirm the identity of the person sought in the warrant.
Having considered the motion, memorandum, and reply brief filed by the
defendant, the memorandum filed by the State, oral argument, exhibits admitted into
evidence, the sworn testimony of witnesses, including the defendant, Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Deputy Brenda Christensen, Salt Lake City Police Officers Bryan Bailey and
Todd Mitchell, and being fully advised in the premises, the Court makes the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant is charged by Information with one count of Unlawful Possession of
a Controlled Substance, a Third Degree Felony.
2. Defendant is alleged to have been in possession of amphetamine, a Schedule II
controlled substance.
3. The Information is based on activities that took place on July 3, 1997, at a
Motel 6 at 1990 West North Temple and at the Metro Jail in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah.
4. On July 3, 1997, while on duty, Salt Lake City Police Detective Bryan Bailey
received a telephone call from the manager of a Motel 6 in Salt Lake City reporting
suspicious activity in room 148.
5. The manager told the police that a "Wendell Navanick" was registered in room
148.

6. Detective Bailey, busy with another matter, asked Salt Lake City Police
Detective Todd Mitchell to investigate.
7. Detective Mitchell called police dispatch by telephone and asked them to
check the name "Wendell Navanick" for warrants.
8. The dispatcher informed Detective Mitchell that there was a warrant for a
person with that name and the date of birth of 11/27/71.
9. An arrest warrant for "Wendall Navanick," with an address of "1985 South
200 East, SLC, UT 84115," date of birth "11/27/71," on a charge of telephone harassment
was signed by Judge Judith Atherton, Third District Court, West Valley Department, on
May 7,1997.
10. Bail on the warrant was set at $1000.00.
11. No physical description was provided on the warrant.
12. Detective Mitchell checked the police department's computerized records and
determined that there were two dates of birth associated with the name Wendell
Navanick, 11/27/71, and an alias date of birth of 1/7/71.
13. Detective Mitchell went to room 148 of the Motel 6, 1990 West North
Temple, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on July 3,1997.
14. The door to room 148 opened and two women and a man were seen inside.
15. The man inside the room was identified as the defendant, Wendell Navanick.

16. An officer accompanying Detective Mitchell recognized the man in room 148
as Wendell Navanick.
17. Defendant told Detective Mitchell that his date of birth was 1/7/71, which
was consistent with the information that Detective Mitchell had obtained from police
records.
18. Defendant was informed of the warrant and denied that he was the person
named in the warrant.
19. Defendant's testimony was not credible.
20. Defendant had no identification to show to the police.
21. Although "Wendell Navanick" is an uncommon name, at least two persons by
that name, including the defendant, have been booked into the Salt Lake County Jail.
22. Defendant had used names other than Wendell Navanick in the past.
23. Detective Mitchell stated that suspects often gave him false names and dates
of birth.
24. Defendant was arrested on the warrant and taken to the Salt Lake Metro Jail
in Salt Lake County.
25. During a routine booking search of the defendant's pockets, a correctional
officer allegedly found a plastic twist containing amphetamine.
26. No search warrant had been issued prior to the booking search.

27. Defendant was booked on the felony charge of Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance and was never booked on the outstanding warrant.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The arrest warrant issued by the Third District Court, West Valley Department
for "Wendall Navanick" was valid.
2. The evidence is inconclusive as to whether defendant was, or was not, the
subject of the arrest warrant.
3. The appropriate standard for determining whether defendant's arrest was valid
is whether the peace officer who had knowledge of the outstanding warrant reasonably
believed the defendant to be the person described in the warrant.
4. The standard is derived from Utah Code Annotated §77-7-11 and Hill v
California. 401 U.S. 797, 802, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 1110 (1971).
5. The Utah Constitution does not dictate a more restrictive standard than the one
established by § 77-7-11 and Hill v. California.
6. The detective, having knowledge of the valid arrest warrant, did not need to
have the warrant in hand in order to make an arrest pursuant to the warrant.
7. Under all the facts and circumstances, the detective had a reasonable belief that
the defendant was the subject of the warrant.

8. There are insufficient facts to suggest that the police were required to have
employed any other efforts to confirm the identity of the defendant than the efforts they
did in fact employ.
9. Defendant was lawfully arrested.
10.

A booking search is a recognized exception to the search warrant

requirement.
11. Defendant, was lawfully searched.
12. The suspected amphetamine was lawfully seized.

Ralph Dellapiana
Attorney for Defendant

